Thursday, November 30, 2006

Creation: true or not, it's True: R' Wieder

Just listened to an mp3 of Rabbi Jeremy Wieder of YU, on the limits of non-literal interpretation of Scripture.

He sets the limits pretty far out, for non-halachic material. Halacha has to be interpreted as Chazal say, which may well be non-literal, but halacha is not affected by changes in science (pace spontaneous generation of body lice).

First, he dismisses "ein mikra yotzei miydei pshuto" -

Then, he surveys the sources.
  1. R' Saadia Gaon (9th century) - if science and literal readings conflict, allegorize the verses. Four places for non-literal readings: contradicts the senses, e.g. Eim Col Chai not being mother of animals; contradicts the intellect, e.g. anthropomorphizing God; contradictory verses; Chazal's presumption of non-literalism.
  2. Rambam (12th century) (Guide II:25) - if philosophy proves that something is true, against our traditional readings of verses, we are forced to allegorize the verses. He talks about two theories of the Eternity of the Universe:
    1. Aristotle: matter is indestructible
    2. Plato: matter is destructible.
    Aristotle's theory is theologically untenable. If there were a proof of it, Rambam would have to suspend his intellect, and surrender to the revealed Truth. Plato's theory only differs from our ideas in that for him, creation is "yesh miyesh" (from pre-existing existence), rather than our "yesh me-ayin" (creatio ex nihilo, from total nonexistence). It would probably be easier to allegorize than all the stuff in the first part of the Guide allegorizing the anthropomorphic verses in the face of the Truth of an incorporeal God.
  3. Teshuva of the Rashba: people may study science, and reinterpret verses if they don't work any more, as long as
    1. no violation of fundamentals of faith
    2. no change in halakha
Ramban on the Torah echoes Saadia's first principle, in explaining the rainbow in Noach - the verse seems to say that it was put in the clouds just then, but clearly it's part of the natural order, so that can't be literally true - it must be, that the rainbow already existed, but that it was given this new significance at this time.

Where is his red line? Matan Torah - the Sinaitic revelation, the founding moment of our people. That could not be allegorized, deliteralized from history, without disturbing the fundamentals of Jewish belief. Genesis 1-11, no problem allegorizing that. The Avos, he would be troubled by an allegorizing interpretation, but it doesn't cross his red line. The Exodus, an allegorical interpretation would really really bother him, but it could still be non-heretical. But Sinai must have happened, as stated, or else the whole Torah can't be True.

But cosmogony, evolution - no fundamental problem, as long as we're not dealing with "evolutionism" - a form of atheism centering on evolution - because evolutionary change is random to the human eye. But the knowledge of God isn't like the knowledge of humans - so God may have a pattern that we can't perceive.

And note, stories can be True, if not literally happened. E.g., Chazal say this of Job, it may never have happened, but it still expresses religious Truths.

A few gems:
  • Science is DEscriptive, Torah is PREscriptive ... the medievals knew this.
  • Some halakhists don't know the boundaries of halakha, some scientists don't know the boundaries of science ... that's where the problem starts.
  • Science and Torah run on parallel tracks - they don't intersect, conflict.

Jewish Mothers of Studio 60

Complaint about this week's episode:

From an Entertainment Weekly article:

> Also infuriating: the running gag about Harriet's inability to tell a
> joke. She needed one for a speech, and Matt gave her one that she
> kept butchering in her attempts to retell it. Matt likened her gag
> mangling to an ailment.

OK, we can debate whether a sketch actor can tell a joke.

But it was the wrong joke for *her*. Wouldn't matter if she told it correctly or not, *she's* not the person to tell a Jewish-mother joke. At best it would just seem incongruous, not funny, and at worst, some kind of put-down. The whole point of the Jewish mother joke is that through sarcasm, the mother makes the son feel guilty. So what's a blonde female Evangelical Christian's relevance to this joke?

It's like, well, someone assigning me to tell a self-denigrating black joke, when I'm a tubby bearded Orthodox Jew of Eastern European descent. It would look bad, if not offensive.

I raised this on an Aaron Sorkin discussion list, and interestingly, the other person who agreed with me had a Jewish name.

Another commentor held that the whole exchange is "ironic", that an Evangelist would be told to tell a Jewish joke, that a comic couldn't do stand-up. "What am I missing?"

My response:

Context.

Within the context of the character giving the speech, it's just wrong. As in, imagine her actually standing up and giving the speech, the joke would probably fall flat.

Within the context of us watching the show, it's ironic, because "look, Matt the Jew gives Harriet the Evangelical a Jewish joke to tell. Ha ha."

Tuesday, November 21, 2006

The Bach

Joel Sirkes Bach (1762-1821), the long-lost grandchild of J.S. Bach. His work recently turned up during a search of the PDQ Bach archives at the University of South North Dakota at Hoople.

Composer of a series of 18 symphonies based on the blessings of the Amidah. Why 18? He was trying to fix the last one, as part of a polemic against the new Enlightenment Romanticism, but died in the middle.

His Second Sonata for Clarinet, Keyboard and Percussion foreshadowed the Klezmer movement in its daring adoption of Eastern European folk motifs and styles of ornamentation. He remains one of the best sources of early documentation of this style. The shift from clarino to trumpet between the second and third movements expressed his longing for the rapidly-disappearing instrument. Use of the ophicleide and ocarina in the Bulgar-Rondo, however, is gratuitous.

As Kapellmeister of the Altneuschul in Prague, he created choral settings for many zemiroth, bringing consciousness of the beauty of Sabbath observance to the early Enlightenment, although they were only rarely performed at the Hamburg Temple, and then only at the after-dinner services.

His untimely passing at the tender age of 59 was due to a großbass blokflöte falling on his foot, which subsequently became gangrenous.

His biography has recently been reprinted by Yashar Books.

Oh, that's the exegete and halachic decisor Bach? Never mind.

Monday, November 20, 2006

Commercial Chanukah Tokenism

Stopped by Macy's this evening. Watched various groups rehearse for the Thanksgiving Day Parade - a group of boys in a drumline marching up & down 34th Street, some tap-dancers from the Monty Python tribute musical SPAMALOT.

Wandered into the store. Poinsettias everywhere, banners, wreaths, stars (the store's logo), Christmas everywhere. A grand arcade down the central corridor of the main floor.





And up at the end, next to the escalators, two token acknowledgements that Not For Everyone Is Christmas Paramount:


Wednesday, November 15, 2006

Good Enough for Us, Not For You

The latest scandal to roil the J-Blogosphere: a mikvah inspector in Jerusalem witnessing rampant man-boy [relations] in a mikva in the main Charedi area of Jerusalem. Harry Maryles called the guy to confirm his story, which he did.

So.

Violent protests against the Gay Parade, which is primarily attended by non-religious, and doesn't actually feature any public lewd acts.

A non-sticky band-aid on mikvaot where Our Guys go, where lewd acts were witnessed. Where the Haredi courts can't do anything more because the guys who financially support the mikva are the ones alleged to be committing these acts. Money talks, after all.

I get it:
  • If it's fun Unzerer, OK.
  • If it's Thoze Guyz, well, we gotta yell and scream and damage property to let it be known how Evil Evil Evil THEY are.
It's OK for our guys to be Evil, but not for You Guys.

Maybe I should switch to The Black-Hat Uniform. It would let me get away with Abominations (toeivot): cheating in business, like the Shevach butcher in Monsey, or gay sex, like these guys in Jerusalem, or idolatry, like certain elements within Lubavitch. The Torah does use the same word (to'eivah, abomination) for all these sins.

Relative morality. That's what I love about Frummak Judaism. Not.

This is not to say, God forbid, that there is a link between wearing the uniform and tolerating, let alone committing, evil. 99-44/100% of guys who wear The Uniform are, I'm sure, many from personal acquaintance, terrific, learned, ehrlich people. But in wearing the Uniform, one is saying "Look at me, I take pride in my great level of Jewish committment and observance."

Which is why when one of them falls (Jack Abramoff, anyone?) it makes a much bigger splash about the moral laxity among Jews. Visible Jews doing wrong, create a greater chillul hashem than some lesbian gal in a tank-top, because the evil is seen as stemming from their greater committment to Hashem and His Torah. I won't say it's fair to those who choose to wear the Jewish Badge, but it's still a real perception.

That, too, I can say from personal experience. As in, before moving to Flatbush, and living among people who wear The Uniform, I too resented the Uniform-wearers for their trumpeting their frumkeit in their clothing. And thus, when I saw some of them morally fail, in various ways, my first response was "Zoo Torah vezoo sechorah? This is the end-result of a life of learning? Feh! I should throw off the whole thing, if that's the end result!"

Only when I learned to see the individuals under the Uniform, did that go away.

Hat tip: Emes v'Emunah

Monday, November 13, 2006

Computer Culture


Google is now part of the American psyche.

Not only is it a verb, "just google /some subject/", it is now a graffito.

Don't need to express an idea concisely on a lamppost/wall/toilet stall, refer to it via Google.

Saturday, October 28, 2006

My Noah Problem

I was asked to give a talk at shul this afternoon, but when I tried to put something together, I couldn't wrap my head around the Noah-flood story. My wife Debbie put it into words: it seems all so arbitrary.

The deeds, the punishment, the covenant, the tower, the tower's punishment - it's the acts of a capricious God. The Torah in Genesis end of ch. 6 says that "vayinachem", God reconsidered His creation of man, who were all behaving with incredible evil. His response? Wipe out all humans, and all animals, with the flood. Who is his messenger? Noah - the most righteous of his generation, but he never once in 120 years of construction goes out and tells anyone why he's building this ark. God tells Jonah to bring his message of doom and repentance, but He doesn't tell Noah anything.

So after God brings this flood, without really giving Mankind a chance to repent, he then says to himself, "I don't think I should do this again."

We have God saying "it was a mistake to create humanity, and I'm going to wipe them out and start again." Then after doing so, "it was a mistake to be so draconian, I'm not going to do that again," and when confronted with an anti-God threat, at Babel, comes up with a less-drastic punishment.

It's a classic repentance tale, except that God is the actor, not the receiver of the repentance. He does something wrong (the Flood), he regrets, decides not to do it again, and when again presented with a threat, goes through with his promise not to do so again. Is that it? Did all those people die so that God could make an example of repentance?

I guess part of it depends on how literally you take the story. If you're willing to take it all as an allegory, the repentance-tale explanation works. If you need the Bible to remain literal, taking Rashi's dictum of "the text does not depart from its literal meaning" as applying to the whole Torah, including the narratives, then you are faced with this arbitrary God. It's like we're expecting God the Great and Powerful, and we get God the charlatan from the Kansas state fair, who doesn't know how to turn the balloon around.

Maybe it's just that our usual medieval paradigms of God, whether of the Philosophers or of the Kabbalists, as omniscient and omnipotent, just don't fit a narrative that was written to be understood by the Israelite exiles from Egypt, 3300 years ago. Maybe there's some other message here. But if we are forced to take the narrative literally (even leaving aside the issues of geological evidence of a global flood), it still makes no sense in terms of contemporary God-ideas.

Men starbt nisht fun a kashye, one doesn't die from a question, but it seems a fairly obvious one, surely it has been addressed in our 3300 years of literary history.

Friday, October 27, 2006

The Chazzan's Responsibility

(gacked from the LSS Echod, their weekly newsletter)

MUSICAL NOTE by Cantor Sherwood Goffin

The Chazzan's Responsibilities

The Chazzan - anyone who leads any service in any shul- has a tremendous responsibility when he stands as the Sh'liach Tzibbur. Many of us who function as Chazzanim take our responsibilities too lightly. The Chazzan is the one person responsible for the Kavannah (concentration, intent) of everyone seated in the shul. He must constantly keep this in mind, since he is davening for every individual there whose mind may not be on his/her davening, as well as praying on behalf of the entire community as a whole. The way the Chazzan davens is the way the Congregation davens. If his intent is on the mark, his melodies effective and his grammar correct, all those in his minyan are uplifted and fulfill their obligation of prayer. In fact, according to the Talmud, the Chazzan also fulfills the obligation to pray for every Jew in the community who is not in shul!!

Daven Well and Sing Along.

Thursday, October 26, 2006

Wolfson Notes IV

10/10

Readings: St. Th. I Q2; Maimo II Intro, Ch 1.

St. Thomas

Cf Q1, article 3: Is Sacred Doctrine a single science?

Are the things true of secular science also true of sacred doctrine?

Classification of science: (Aristotelian)

Science:

Speculative, practical, productive

Problem: is there a parallel subdivision of revealed science?

The rational is divided by faculty:

Faculty

Theoretic area

Subject matter

Reason

Metaphysics

Immovable (immaterial) objects

Sense

Physics

Movable material objects

Memory – imagination

Mathematics

Movable immaterial objects

Thus, theoretical science is divided accordgin to object, that is, its subject matter.

Revealed science:

Angels – immaterial

Corporeal creatures – material

Human behavior – practical

No division! Because

1) revealed science involves only one faculty, since all knowledge here comes from revelation.

2) All subject matters are studied only in their relation to God. Therefore, there is only one subject matter.

There is no subdivision between practical and speculative philosophy, but is it one or the other or both? Both are combined in Revealed Science.

Plato & Aristotle: the speculative life is better than the practical life.

Stoics: practical life is more important than the speculative.

But religious commands, unlike philosophy, were categorical. Therefore, each good is intrinsic, and therefore both speculative and practical life are necessary.

[Philosophic scholastics still thought of the speculative life as higher, though not exclusive of practical life.]

Nobility of science:

Speculative higher than Practical. Within speculative science:

Metaphyscis – noblest

Mathematics

Physics - least noble.

Distributed according to

1) measure of certainty;

2) “nobility” of science.

Problem: since faith applies only where an idea will never be proven by reason, articles of revealed science can be doubted, therefore sacred doctrine is less noble.

No! “certainty” = 1) certain to us;

2) certain in themselves

demonstrability implies that it is certain to us but this is only relative to the prover.

Revelation may not be certain to us, but is objectively certain (and can never be overthrown).

Therefore, Sacred Doctrine is most certain and therefore most noble.

Note phrase: other sciences are “handmaidens” of sacred doctrine. It began with Philo as a religious term, though it was defined by the Stoics

Stoics: Science is

1) encyclical (school), grammar, etc.

2) Philosophy: dialectics, logic, ethics, Physics.

Encyclical studies (liberal arts) are the handmaidens of Philosophy.

Philo added revealed science as “wisdom”, “just as encyclical studies are the handmaidens of philosophy, so is philosophy the handmaiden of religion.”

Monday, October 23, 2006

Wolfson Notes III

Please comment, if you read, I'd like to know if I'm getting it more or less right. I sometimes include a {?} when I'm not sure of something; if someone has a better idea what it might be, please chime in.

* * *

10/5

Averroes (cont.)

Philosophical Faith consists of 1st premises and demonstrables

Religious Faith consists of both demonstrables and undemonstrables.

The two kinds of faith are found in two kinds of people in that the pastor can demonstrate what smiple people cannot.

Boht kinds are equally good for the kind of man for whom it is adapted

(!) – Each kind of man ought to have and stick to the kind of faith suited to him.

Therefore, the Philosopher must be able to demonstrate, while the Simpleton must not try to demonstrate. It would lead to abuses (like popularized medicine) to do otherwise. [Note political reasons (causes).]

Maimonides

Double Faith, like Averroes, but it is better to demonstrate and it is every man’s duty to try to prove. Therefore, the Philosopher is the best type of man.

St. Thomas (#2 {II-II}, question 2)

Faith is an assent but is not identical with it. Faith is a species of assent.

Assent may applie to syllogisms, prime premises or whatever, while Faith is a voluntary choice of one side of a moot point, and then belief in its certainty.

As a religious term, Faith applies onlyt to what isn’t demonstrated. Faith implies that one believes before getting proof.

One can study demonstrations, but when proved, it is no longer an object of faith for hime. Though for others it remains an object of Faith.

Demonstration (and thus demonstration of faith) does not lessen merit, and may increase it,provided that faith precedes science (i.e., demonstration)

There is a problem: why are some demonstrables revealed? [Note: this implies that God (and nature) does nothing in vain.]

Clement

[held that Greek Philosophy was a kind of revelation] à why two revelations? Philosophy as revealed is a short-cut to salvation. But why a short-cut?

Origen

God could not leave Man to his own (intellectual) devices because of the ”necessities of life” (people canpt spend the time) and the “weakness of man” (inadequacy of some at reasoning).

Maimonides (Guide I:34-6)

1) Study of Metaphysics is difficult

2) Some people are inadequate

3) Metaphysics (study of religion) has prerequisites

4) Some people are not “the philosophical type”

5) Metaphysics must be free of financial troubles.

{marginal note – “cf. Summa Contra Gentiles”}

St. Thomas

Because if we use human reason alone

· The ideas are only known to a few

· Only after a long time,

· And are mixed with errors

Question 1: Is the Sacred Doctrine a science, one science, or the noblest science? (cf Aristotle, Nic. Ethics VI ch. 3-6)

It’s a science, vs. Art, Wisdom or Prudence

Science à object of science is a necessary truth

Which can be taught and learned

The scientific faculty is that of demonstrating the less-known from that which is better-known and/or self-evident.

Its Principles come from the Nous (intuition, reason. Therefore science comes from Reason.

Since religious knowledge comes from revelation, is it science?

1) rational

or

1) science

2) revealed

2) revelation


Science:



General line of argument:

Though here Aristotle defined science so, elsewhere he indicate that primary premises may come from:

1) Intuitive, direct knowledge; or

2) Conclusions of another science; or

3) Popular probabilistic assent

Therefore, it’s also legitimate to posit that one’s primary premises come from revelation.

Therefore: Sacred Doctrine is a species (revealed) of science.

Sunday, October 22, 2006

Wolfson Notes II

10/3

“Religion” – knowledge found in scriptures. Knowledge here is of Divine origin.

“Philosophy” – knowledge found in what the Greeks had written & called “Philosophy”. The origin is in human reason.

There is a large overlap between religious and philosophical problems, e.g. nature, origin of Man and the world; ethics; God, etc.

The job of Medieval Philosophy is to correct philosophy according to religion, and to clarify religion according to philosophy.

The Concept of Faith

As a religious term (mainly from the OT), faith is the acceptance of the content of revealed writings as true.

As a philosophical term, it has been defined differently by various writers:

Aristotle: a judgment that partial knowledge is true (correspondence), i.e., a consciousness of the truth of a doctrine. We classify knowledge in which we may have faith as follows:

1) direct knowledge

a. sense perception

b. first principles (a priori “primary premises”)

2) Scientific knowledge (indirect, through reasoning)

Sometimes Aristotle implies (as the etymology suggests) the necessity of persuasion; i.e., one does not automatically believe.

Regarding evaluation, he uses the term “assent”, albeit only once.

Stoics: saw it differently

“Faith” = “strong opinion.”

“assent” = Aristotle’s “faith”, as well as “assent”, i.e. regarding both knowledge and evaluation. Assent is clearly voluntary

Religious: (Church Fathers)

Clement: used the Stoic term “assent”, but combined it with faith.

“Faith” equals by definition “an assent of the soul” (cf. James)

Interpret in religious terms of “faith” thus:

There are three kinds of knowledge in Scripture

1) That which cannot be rationally demonstrated;

2) That which is self-evident as primary premises (or like sensation)

3) That which can be pvoed through that which is more or less self-evident, like Aristotle’s scientific knowledge.

Later: Faith implies that there is sometimes doubt, therefore it is applicable only to rubric #1, not to what must be believed.

Others: held that there is always eventually doubt.

Since Faith must be voluntary, a child or a simple-minded man has faith; but does the philosopher have faith? Therefore, is the man who accepts sans reason, better than one who proves the idea?

[Insertion from loose sheet; seems a logical place to add:]

Arabian Philosophy

529: the Schools in Athens were closed, but philosophy had already been imported by the scholars of Rhodes into Persia.

Philosophical tradition:

No Plato

Mostly Aristotle, though a couple of neo-Platonic treatises were attributed to Aristotle which tended to blend the two.

[note medieval anti-purism, whereby one can attribute to a man any doctrine which can be reconciled with his works] Arabs never thought of two competing philosophis (Plato vs. Aristotle) but of one philosophy with two masters.

Mutazillite:

Applying Religion to Faith

Unicity of God, justice of divine will [independent of divinity (?)]

Contra anthropomorphism (negative theology)

Doctrine that God conforms to justice [not the reverse] implies that there is an objective Law (or values) discoverable by Religion.

Mutakallimun

Al’Ash-ai:

Orthodoxy contrasted with the application of Greek philosophy to Theology.

This led to a secularization of philosophy – studied for its own sake. In Arabic tradition, the philosophers were not the clerics or theologians [and it was the philosophers and laymen that influence Christian theology].

Al-kindi (d. 873)

De intellectu: concerning distinctions: possible – active intellect. Separation of active intellect from individual soul always in action, superior to soul on which it act.

Beginning of Arab doctrine: one (1) active intellect for all men [cf Berkeley one over-mind source of ideas in souls].

Al-Farabi (d. 950)

Distinguished Essence – Existence by way of saving the Greek rational world (Causes {?}) and OT, unlimited absolute power of God (and therefore, the contingence of the world). Notice in Aristotle that this was only a logical distinction, [that a thing is not implied by what it is]. Here it is metaphysical. Existence is always an accidental predicate of essence. [unlike St. Thomas, for whom there exists that which is neither included or accidental but the act of essence or being].

The cause of what things are is that of our knowledge

Averroes (d. 1198)

Maimonides (1204)

St. Thomas (1274)

Averroes (Ibn Rushd):

mainly known as a commentator on Aristotle. – therefore the “Pure Philosophy” is but one book on the relation between religion an dphilosophy (i.e. Applied Philosophy).

Double Truth theory (Averroist heresy – beware of Medieval tendency to ascribe all heresy to him)

Double Truth – there exist two truths, one for philosophers, one for people.

Actually, it’s a Double Faith theory:

Faith =

1) belief in what can be demonstrated (scientific faith); or

2) belief in what cannot be demonstrated.

Wolfson Notes I

A new continuing feature: my late uncle Richard Wisan's notes from Harry Austryn Wolfson's class on Medieval Philosophy, from Harvard in the fall of 1950. Wolfson was one of the primary scholars on medieval philosophy, particularly in the Arab world.

The course focuses on comparing and contrasting Moses Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas, who, according to Uncle Dick, really said a lot of similar things, even if one was in the Judeo-Arabic milieu and the other in the Church.

* * *

Definition & delimitation of Medieval Philosophy:

Equation of Medieval Philosophy with Scholasticism leaves a gap of 200 years between the closing of the Greek schools and the opening of the Medieval ones, & thus between Ancient and Medieval Philosophy.

The close parallel between Philosophy and Politics is artificial.
Boethius (480-525 – near the Fall of Rome); Augustine (354-430 – near the dissolution of the Empire) are sometimes taken as the first medieval philosopher, but these men were in the middle of a transition, not the founders of M. P.

The equation of Christian thought with Medieval Philsophy also fails, because

1) Christian philosophy begins with St. John (of the Church Fathers);

2) Muslim & Jewish philosophy were clearly in the same tradition-pattern as contemporary Christian philosophy.

Hegel and others, equating Christian and Medieval Philosophy, saw Jewish and Muslim philosophy as peripheral, or even as by-products.

From Plato to the 17th century, Western philosophy was written in

Greek

Plato

15th C.

Latin

Cicero

17th C.

Syriac

6th-

13th C.

Arabic

8th

12th C.

Hebrew

10th-

16th C.

1st-century BCE – there was a split in the kind of Religious literature referred to by Philosophers in Greek and Latin.

1) originally “religion” meant Paganism.

2) The “Hellenizing Jews” of Alexandria begain to write Greek philosophy in Hebrew. They also wrote down Jewish, and later, New Testament traditions.

Syriac: mainly used for Christian philosophy

Arabic: mainly used for Muslim philosophy, which was a tradition very close to both Jewish and Christian. Some Jewish and a little Christian philosophy were also written in Arabic.

All this new tradition is interrelated. All included Greek and Pagan philosophy; they addressed the same problems with the same methods and “tone” or Weltanschauung.

Thus, the departure begins in the 1st century BCE, in Alexandria, and continues, universally unchallenged down to about the 17th century. The first great break with this tradition was Spinoza.

The differences among Christian, Muslim and Jew were religious, not philosophical.

Medieval Philosophy

Pure (technical) analysis of Greek problems:

1) Logic (e.g. Universals, not the problem of medieval philosophy)

2) Physics (matter, forms, prime mover, etc.)

3) Psychology (soul, faculties, immortality …)

4) Ethics (good, virtue, …)

Applied philosophy – analysis of scriptural traditions.

1) Relations between Faith and Reason

2) Existence of God

3) Nature of God

4) Relation between God and the World (creation & government)

5) Man (soul – body)

6) Communication between God & Man (revelation)

7) Ethics (free-will, evil)

No difference here among the three monotheisms

Dogmatics:

1) Trinity – Christian only

2) Attributes – Muslim only

3) Eternity of the Law – Jews only

4) Resurrection – all three.

We must make a selection, so we’ll concentrate on Applied Philosophy, since medieval pure philosophy is really a part of ancient philosophy.

Texts:

Basic Writings of Thomas Aquinas (Random House)

Guide to the Perplexed – Maimonides

Friday, October 20, 2006

Not so Amazin'

Yeah, so I watched the game last night, with Debbie gnashing her teeth beside me through the last inning. She couldn't bear to watch - she likes the abstraction of the Mets, but not enough to actually watch any games, because it's too disappointing when they don't do well. So I watch the occasional playoff game, me, the Yankee fan.

And as the strains of "Casey at the Bat" rolled through my head all through that last half-inning, well, we weren't the only ones feeling like denizens of Mudville last night.

A writer friend put it into words: Beltran at the Bat.

Wednesday, October 11, 2006

The Black Dahlia Willow

This year, as always, my aravos are almost black (today being 3rd day Chol Hamoed).

One year, I found the perfect system to preserve them, but I can't do it any more. For about a year, Ziploc (S.C. Johnson, a family company) sold something called "vegetable bags", made of clear plastic with rows of tiny holes in it, meant to release the moisture of vegetables at a natural rate, so they won't rot so quickly as in a sealed bag. I made a 3-layer wrap: tinfoil on the outside, a damp (NOT wet) paper towel next, then a layer of vegetable bag (cut in half, so it makes a long narrow piece). Wrap all of this around the aravos/hadassim in or out of their basket, and store in the fridge. Rewet the paper every day. I had reasonably green aravos until Hoshana Rabba. If I put the paper towel in contact with the leaves, the leaves turn black. If I do nothing, the leaves turn black.

But this vegetable bag is not sold in the US any more, and I can't even order it from the company (I asked). It is, however, sold in Canada. So I guess, by next summer, I'll have to ask a Canadian contact to send me a box of gallon-size vegetable bags.

Tuesday, October 03, 2006

Davening: Drawn-Out or With Kavvanah

Ari Kinsberg commented on this blog, responding to a post I had made at Hirhurim, so I'm promoting my response to a post.

>most people i know simply don't care for a chazzan who
>shlepps with oy yoy yoys and very often is just not that good.


Well, neither do I, but it's a fine line, and often depends on how well you know the chazan. For instance, Cantor Goffin (one of the big guys at the Belz Cantorial School) at LSS (where I grew up) shleps things out somewhat, but you can feel how he means every word. I've timed his Shabbos mussaf amidah, and it's 17 minutes: 9 through kedushah, 8 for the rest. At my fanciest, it's not more than 12-13 minutes, 7 through Kedushah, 5-6 for the rest, but then I'm not professionally trained.

On the other hand, Cantor Malovany (the other big guy at Belz) does Selichos like a throwback to Yossele Rosenblatt. With a choir. It's an experience. You can see he means it, but I really don't need that geshlept Slichos. He did a marvelous job at my great-aunt's funeral, though, not stretched at all.

However, if you get a rent-a-cantor who does a long drawn-out fancy service, it's often hard to tell how much is kavvanah, and how much is gaavah (we used to get that at the LSS downstairs service on High Holidays - my parents didn't have money to spring for Main Sanctuary seats).

But that leads to the attitude I see among many in my own shul, of "I don't like chazzonus", because the showy aspect has, for too many, overshadowed the kavvanah aspect. So even the one or two cadenzas I do in RH/YK davening (most often mincha in my new shul, used to be shacharit in the old place where there was a dearth of local talent) can draw complaints.

I like them, they frame the service (one on Ram V'Nisa, a sort-of drawn-out turn, and one on mekadesh Yisrael veyom hazicaron (3 turns up, an arpeggio down, ending on another turn; 9 measures in 2/4)). Similarly I like to do a somewhat geshlept end of Yekum Purkan (start off with a nice opener) and Shema Yisrael in kedushah, both copied from Cantor Goffin, and somewhat abridged because I don't have his ability. Just timed the V'chol Mi, came to 1:07, and Shma-Hu Elokeinu to 1:00.

People used to like the long, repetitive, redundant, fancy stuff, and found it inspiring. Times change. However, I do agree with Cantor Goffin and R' Rich Wolpoe that nusach is imporant. The Shlomo Carlebach tunes for the piyutim are nice, congregational singing is fun, but it only works if one also has a solid grip on nusach. A lot of tunes, e.g. Aleinu, Unesaneh Tokef, Maariv nusach - are considered "misinai" tunes, going back at least to the 14th century, uniting all of Ashkenaz Jewry with each other and with its heritage. Falling out of the High Holidays nusach into, e.g., Yom Tov, which is easy enough to do if you haven't practiced enough, especially in Yaaleh Veyavo, can be jarring, ending a bracha G-D-c instead of on a minor triad (G-Eb-c) - that half-tone is the difference between YT and HH.

Fortunately, the biggest complainers about that don't come to shul all that often.

Interesting YK Coincidence

Far be it from me to have fun at the expense of the many people who suffered because of this man, but I noticed something interesting during vidui yesterday. The Butcher of Monsey's name was Moshe, beginning with 'מ', and sure enough, it was the intersection of the two 'מ' lines in the Al Chet in which he failed: 'מאכל ומשתה' and 'משא ומתן' (food and drink; and business).

The associated lines for 'י' are pretty general, Evil Inclination and Knowing/Unknowing. Which I suppose means I should watch out for the yetzer hara leading me into unknowing sin, which then might lead to despair, and then intentional sin. Good advice for everybody, I guess.

For those who haven't apologized to Stephen Colbert yet (1-888-OOPS-JEW), remember, you have until Hoshana Rabba to appeal unfavorable Yom Kippur verdicts.

Friday, September 29, 2006

Past Yom Kippur Writings

The tunes of Yom Kippur reflect/generate changing emotional states during the course of the day

The shorter confession (Vidui Ashamnu) as understood by the Chayei Adam (translation)

Kol Nidre as an example for Hashem - forgive us as we forgive vows.

Monday, September 25, 2006

Artscroll Modim Kvetch

Modim, modim (woops, can't say that)

Modim anachnu lach. Archetypal Prayer of Thanksgiving (our prayers are usually broken down into Praise, Request, and Thanksgiving). Except that when there's a minyan, we say an alternate version during the repetition, the Modim Derabbanan. And there, folks, is a mystery.

R' Alan Brill, in last week's Philosphy of Prayer class at Drisha, noted that the prayer in the Amidah is what he calls "entreaty", rather than "petitionary" prayer. Petitionary prayer is asking for X in return for Y. E.g., a misheberach - please bless so-and-so because I'm pledging to tzedakah, or because the congregation is praying on their behalf. But when we look at the intermediate brachot (4-16 in the daily prayers), where we ask for stuff, we ask in the merit of God's goodness - because You are a great healer, heal us; because You are great in forgiveness, forgive us. R' Mayer Twersky, following (I think) his grandfather RYB Soloveitchik, explains those blessings as expressions of confidence that God will do X or Y, not actual requests that He do X or Y (leaving out the insertions for health and prosperity).

However, Modim Derabbanan, the additional Modim, which is a collection of alternate Modims offered by different rabbis in the Talmud (Sotah 40a), all versions clearly end "al she'anu modim lach", "because we thank You". We thank You ... for giving us life, ... so You shall continue to sustain us, and return us from exile so that we may fulfill Your laws completely, because we thank You" And that's clearly a request. We expect that You will do X and Y, because we thank You. Our thanking Him creates the quid-pro-quo of petitionary prayer.

Rashi tries to avoid the issue, by reading it as a repetition of the first phrase, making it "thus You shall do X and Y ... because You inspired us to cleave to You and to thank You". Which makes little enough sense, although perhaps, it can be read as "You do X and Y to create an environment where we are obligated to thank You", but since they are future needs, such as redemption, that explanation doesn't make much sense to me.

Artscroll takes Rashi one step further. They write

"[We thank You] for inspiring us to thank You."

Not only does it turn the phrase around, and insert "inspiring us" (following Rashi), it then adds the bracketed passage "[we thank You]" which makes the whole thing completely incoherent, and unrelated to the Hebrew.

The Hebrew is simple enough, despite Rashi's attempt to revise the words of Chazal: it's a petitionary prayer. If Chazal put it in, it must be OK, even if it's not OK enough for Rashi or Artscroll. Even the Beis Yosef (R' Yosef Caro) understands this literally, contra Rashi. He gives both Rashi's emendation and the clear simple meaning.

"because we thank You" into "we thank You for inspiring us to thank You". Incoherent babble in the name of revisionism. I thought it was only the heterodox prayerbook authors who took such liberties with their translations. Apparently I was wrong.

* * *

Just for reference, here's the relevant passage in the Soncino translation:

While the Precentor recites the paragraph 'We give thanks' what does the congregation say? — Rab declared: 'We give thanks unto Thee, O Lord our God, because we are able to give Thee thanks'. Samuel declared: 'God of all flesh, seeing that we give Thee thanks'. R. Simai declared: 'Our Creator and Creator of all things in the beginning, seeing that we give Thee thanks.' The men of Nehardea declared in the name of R. Simai: 'Blessings and thanksgiving to Thy great Name because Thou hast kept us alive and preserved us, seeing that we give Thee thanks'. R. Aha b. Jacob used to conclude thus: 'So mayest Thou continue to keep us alive and be gracious to us; and gather us together and assemble our exiles to Thy holy courts to observe Thy statutes and to do Thy will with a perfect heart, seeing that we give Thee thanks'. R. Papa said: Consequently let us recite them all.

We follow R' Papa - we say them all. Rashi explains that each came and added their phrase onto the previous ones.

* * *

And, looking around the Web, I see this was already discussed on mail-jewish 12 years ago. Oh well, אין חדש תחת השמש.

Thursday, September 21, 2006

Camah Qolot (How Many Shofar Blasts)

A friend is having a dispute with his daughter's teacher over how many shofar blasts are traditional for Ashkenazim. The teacher commits Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc, maintaining that because accurate modern machzorim such as Artscroll say that we do 100, therefore that is the way it is, and the earlier machzorim that had other sets were misprints or mistaken.

Just because it's so now, doesn't make it true for the past, though. I went through a number of sources to find out just what was the "old minhag ashkenaz", the "original" custom, and well, there isn't just one, there are quite a lot. However, Artscroll is correct in that 100 has become nearly universally accepted today.

Going back into the past, the Tosafot (12th-century French) bring 40, 60 and 100 as reasonable options and reasons for both. All agree that we do 30 to start out with, since that's the Talmudic minimum (R' Abahu, in Rosh Hashanah 34a). Opinions differ as to which are blown during the repetition of the mussaf amidah, and what is done at the end of services. 40 is brought as the common custom in Franco-Germany (where the Tosafists lived), but they would prefer 60, and they cite the Aruch (earlier Ashkenazic work) that one should blow 100 to fit a Midrash about the 100 sobs that Sisra's mother cried over his death. Rabbenu Tam brings a further variant of 42.

So what are all these variants?

Knock 30 off the top - all agree we do 30 after Torah reading.

After each section of the Musaf: M(alchuyot, Z(ichronot, S(hofarot:
and the blows T(ekiah), S(hevarim), and (te)R(uah), which are grouped as TSRT, TST, or TRT.

10: M-TSRT, Z-TST, S-TRT
12: M-TSRT, Z-TSRT, S-TSRT
30: M-TSRT TST TRT, Z-TSRT TST TRT, S-TSRT TST TRT

And then at the end, either 30, 40, or 10 are blown to make up larger numbers.

So who historically did the various customs?

Tosafot (Rosh Hashanah 33b) list all of the combinations of blasts during the Amidah, so they justify 40, 42, or 60.

RAbN Yarchi (R' Abraham of Lunel, later 12th C.) brings a variety of these customs in his Sefer haManhig (laws of shofar-blowing 20).

One should do the 30 option, but the Sages worried about troubling the congregation, so some do 10. In Sefarad (Christian northern Spain?) and Provence they do [three times] TSRT for Malchuyot, TST for Zichronot, and TRT for Shofarot, making 30. In some parts of France they do TSRT [TST,TRT?] for all three, like R' Yaakov of C. (Corbeil?), and so it is in Champagne and all of Burgundy, doing 30 among all. I hear that in Bavel they do 100, 30 during the silent amidah, 30 during the repetition, and 10 more at the end, to fit the midrash about Sisra's mother. (paraphrased, from Heidenheim machzor note).

So the Western custom was 60, in one variant or another. What about more recent days?

The Shulchan Aruch, recording mostly Sephardic custom in his day, advises 61: 30 at the start, then M-3xTSRT, Z-3xTST, S-3xTRT, or 12, 9 and 9, with the Sephardic Teruah Gedolah at the end.

Our prime witness for Eastern Europe in the 15th century is the Rema, who says that the common custom was 40: (30; 4;3;3) as above. Some would add another 30 at the end, but this was not necessary.

The Vilna Gaon, in the 18th century, seeing value to 60, held that one should blow an extra 20 at the end, bringing the total to 60. So for him, in Lithuania, they were still mostly following the Rema's 40 custom.

In the early 19th century, R' Wolf Heidenheim in Germany produced a set of very accurate machzorim, with a good commentary, on both textual and hermeneutic issues. He produced versions for both Germany (Western Europe) and Poland (Eastern Europe). His machzorim record 42 as the Eastern custom, and 40 as the Western custom, which is still what is printed in current Roedelheim German-custom machzorim today.

The Breuers kehillah in Washington Heights still blows 40 *see below. They then add 30 at the end for a total of 70, and another 30 at mincha for people who missed the morning service. However, another German congregation of my acquaintance does 100, adding 60 at the end to make up the total.

By the end of the 19th century, most poskim were pushing for 100 to become universal. Both the Mishnah Brurah and the Aruch Hashulchan argued for 100, following the Shelah, who was influenced by Kabbalah, which in turn was influenced by the customs of Sephardim. So today, the current Sephardic custom, also used by R' Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, is 30; 10,10,10 in the silent amidah, 10,10,10 in the repeition, and 10 more at the end, making 100. Sephardim add a 101st Teruah Gedolah at the end.

So when Artscroll reports that this is "almost universal", it is correct. However, one is not justified in concluding from that statement that 100 was always the normal custom. The normal customs seem to have been 40, 42 and 60, until 100 years ago.

And if your eyes aren't spinning at the end of all that, you'll have a better understanding of where our shofar blowing came from, and how much you have to make up if you miss part.

UPDATES:

1) I am reliably informed that Breuers blows 100, and has at least since the 1980s. 10 during the Amidah, 30 during Full Kaddish, and 30 after Anim Zmirot

2) R' Arie Folger, Chief Rabbi of the Israelitische Gemeinde Basel, tells me that they blow 70.

3) ADDeRabbi: noted & fixed.

Sunday, September 17, 2006

AishDas Shabbaton Elul 2006 III

Friday night's panel discussion, on converting intentional sins (zedonot) to merits (zechuyot) through Repentance from Love is available here, hosted by AishDas.

In case I don't get to write up more substantial summaries, here are my initial notes from the first two sessions at the Shabbaton:

Lessons of 12/23 - how do I change my life? (R' Micha Berger):

How have we changed? teshuvah? what about "one day before we die"

How do we change? Micha narrated his experiences on 9/11, walking into and back out of the cloud of debris, since he came from Battery Park, walking up the island to his brother on 97th, tremendous sense of everyone helping everyone else, getting home at 11-12 at night. Everyone said "the world changed, we have changed", but after a year, let alone five, is it really that changed?

One thing I've sadly noticed is that every year I do teshuvah for pretty much the same things.

There is a verse in Devarim (Deut) which reads "The 'Eyes' of G-d are on [the Land of Israel] from reishis hashanah ad acharis shanah -- the beginning of the year until the end of a year." The Satmar Rav points out the asymmetery; first the use of "hashanah", "THE year", but it closes with just "shanah", "A year".

The Satmar Rav notes that unfortunately that is the way with most of us. Every year, when it begins, we are all excited and determined. "This is going to be THE year!" The year I finally have the patience my children deserve, the year I get to synagogue regularly, the year... But the year goes by, and by the end, it's just "a year", another year on the calendar.

To avoid this, we need to look at teshuvah as a process, not as a goal. How do I keep getting better, rather than how far am I from my ideal state? Paraphrasing Kierkegaard: becoming not being. Teshuvah as a process, not as a one-shot deal on Yom Kippur or even during Elul, but on-going:

Don't focus on "who do I want to be", but "how do I keep becoming better" - teshuvah is stepping on the accelerator, not arriving at a destination.

* * *

Lo Tisna: hate blocks repentance between people (R' Micha Berger, discussion facilitators R' Gil Student, Dr. Shani Bechhofer):

The verse links "do not hate your brother in your heart, rebuke your compadre, do not bear sin on behalf of your brother"

Hate in the heart rather than openly. Rather, one should air the hate, resolve it, restore shalom if possible, and thus not bear the sin of hate because of one's ongoing unresolved issues.

Hate is not anger, hate is a state, while anger is immediate, reaction.

Anger is taken care of with "lo tikom velo titor". hate is separate issur.

Hate - Rambam? - better to clear the air with your fellow, if you hate him - this is tochacha - "i don't like to bring this up, but you know, what you said/did the other day really hurt me"

Pragmatic suggestions: if you're tired of hating the other, just lie in his favor, say you were wrong - sheker is OK in the cause of shalom, saith the Gemara.

Try to clear the air with the other, don't keep it bottled up, because it will come out in even worse ways, when you interact with that person or in similar situations.

Tape timings for the mp3 file, about 90 min. all told

0-3:30 Stu Feldhamer's intro with gemara
3:30-26:20 R' Sokol
26:20-52:30 Gil
52:30-82:40 Micha
82:40-88:45 questions
88:45-end Stu wraps up